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At the end of violent conflict, the most difficult task for most countries is the 
reintegration of former combatants into civilian life and employment. Failure to 
do this can leave the door open for further protests and social disorder. In 2009, 
after a five-year armed rebellion by militants against the government and the oil 
industry in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, the presidency implemented the 
Post-Amnesty Programme (PAP). Unfortunately, the PAP’s design failed to take 
the labour needs of the private sector into account, leaving many ex-combatants 
without the right skills to find employment and reliant on a monthly stipend from 
the government. The Nigerian government needs a deeper understanding of the 
private sector to mitigate the risk of rising unemployment and a breakdown of 
law and order in the Niger Delta. 
Jobs for Ex-Militants in the 
 Niger Delta – Why Isn’t the 
 Private Sector Involved? 
Coming out of conflict to find 
employment
During the conflict, armed militants claimed 
to represent the interests of marginalised 
communities in the Niger Delta region who were 
not benefitting from revenues generated from 
oil production in their communities. The militants 
attacked oil industry infrastructure, significantly 
cutting Nigeria’s oil output and reducing the 
country’s earnings from crude oil export. 
In 2009, the Nigerian government initiated a 
peace process with armed militants in the Niger 
Delta. Under its terms, militants who freely 
handed over their weapons and demobilised 
would not be prosecuted and would receive 
benefits. These benefits included: a formal 
education in Nigeria or abroad, small loans to 
start businesses, as well as a monthly allowance of 
approximately US$400 (significantly higher than 
Nigeria’s minimum wage of US$60 per month). 
Leaders of militant groups were also offered large 
and highly profitable contracts in the oil industry 
and other sectors of the economy. In the wake 
of the amnesty programme, ex-militant leaders 
gained political power and influence in the cities 
to which they returned.
Training for the wrong sector
As part of this process the government 
implemented the PAP to train ex-militants in 
educational and vocational skills. The objective was 
to enable them to find employment in the private 
sector that would provide a sustainable means of 
livelihood. Yet, evidence shows that most ex-
militants who have participated in the PAP have 
been unable to find work in the Niger Delta.
A significant number of participants wanted 
training to find work in the oil sector due to the 
high wages and the prestige associated with 
working in the sector. However, the oil sector 
does not provide a significant number of jobs 
within the private sector. Despite this, most of 
the skills taught by the PAP were related to the 
oil industry. The education and training were 
largely defined by the aspirations of ex-militants 
themselves, not by the needs and labour 
demands of the private sector, who would be 
providing employment. This reduced the ability 
of the PAP to facilitate employment, especially 
in areas other than the oil sector, as ex-militants 
were not trained for areas that could provide 
employment.
A disincentivising stipend
Aside from the programme failing to understand 
the labour needs of the private sector, the 
monthly stipend provided to PAP participants has 
also served as a disincentive to find employment. 
The stipend paid is significantly higher than the 
minimum wage in Nigeria, and participants are 
unlikely to find employment in the private sector 
that will have similar financial reward. The PAP 
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Policy recommendations
1. Conduct a baseline survey on needs of the private sector
The Nigerian government should conduct a baseline survey of the needs of private 
sector employers in the non-oil and gas sectors to inform and shape the future of 
the PAP. Government needs to find out the types of skills required by these sectors 
and their potential to create job vacancies and absorb workers, as well as the wage 
rates offered by employers in the region. This baseline survey should also include 
an understanding of how the government can increase the capacity of the private 
sector to create jobs.
 
2. Develop a realistic exit plan for the PAP
An exit plan for the PAP should focus on using monthly stipends to place ex-
militants in private sector enterprises so that they can acquire work ethics and skills 
to enable them to find work for themselves. This plan should have a clear timeline, 
and the stipends should be phased out at the end of the timeline.
 
3. Post-conflict countries should learn lessons from the PAP and other 
reintegration programmes  
The PAP has important lessons for employment programmes for ex-militants in 
other post-conflict countries. Failure to take the private sector into account, especially 
sectors within it that have a demand for labour, limits the impact of employment 
programmes for ex-combatants. It is also important and urgent for international 
agencies, non-governmental organisations, and governments to share lessons and 
experiences to shape post-conflict employment programmes, and ensure that 
ex-militants are supported to find sustainable employment without long-term 
dependency on the state. 
failed to take into account the wages and 
incomes of the private sector in designing 
its own incentives for the programme. 
Ex-combatants have become dependent 
on the monthly stipend of US$400 
and are not encouraged to seek out 
opportunities in the private sector, even 
where they exist. The PAP has therefore 
largely become a disguised subsidy 
programme for unemployed ex-militants in 
the Niger Delta. 
Lack of an exit strategy
Despite the fact that the PAP was 
originally designed to last for five years 
(2010–15), the Nigerian government has 
repeatedly postponed its termination. 
This postponement has mainly occurred 
because of threats from ex-militants who 
have been unable to find work even after 
participating in the PAP. The lack of an exit 
strategy shows that even though the PAP 
was designed to facilitate employment for 
ex-militants, the government clearly did 
not have a considered plan on how this 
process would work in reality. 
As the PAP continues, the Nigerian 
government has to continue to pay 
ex-militants their monthly stipends to 
ensure that they do not create new 
security threats for the oil industry in the 
Niger Delta. This has become an unending 
subsidy programme for unemployed and 
underemployed youth, and is an open-
ended burden on public finances in the 
Niger Delta.
